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The expression "the right to die" is ambiguous. It can mean a liberty to be 
immune from coercive interventions which would prevent death and prolong the 
dying process. But this meaning is better expressed by saying that it is an aspect of 
our right to life, bodily integrity, and personal inviolability. In another sense it can 
mean an entitlement to the means, including the acts of another, necessary to 
bring about death. This is the sense the expression has for those who subscribe to 
the philosophy of the Society for the Right to Die, formerly called the Euthanasia 
Society, and of the Hemlock Society. The right to die in this sense is also defended 
by those who accept the "Plea for Beneficent Euthanasia" drafted by Marvin 
Kohl and Paul Kurtz, who hold that belief in the value and dignity of the 
individual person "requires respectful treatment, which entails the right to 
reasonable self-determination," and conclude that "no rational morality can 
categorically forbid the termination oflife if it has been blighted by some horrible 
malady for which all known remedial measures are unavailing."1 It is a right to 
choose death, a right to be killed. 
It is not irrelevant, in my opinion, to note that a right of this kind seems to be 
implied by the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment undergirding the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In that case 
Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor gave as one of the central reasons for 
reaffirming the "central holding" of Roe v. Wade the meaning of "liberty" in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. According to them, matters "involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart ofliberty is the right to define one's own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State. "2 Surely, one of the "most intimate 
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime," and "central to personal 
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dignity and autonomy," is the choice whether or not one wishes to be killed. 
Here I will argue that there is no "right to die" in this sense. I will first 
summarize the reasons advanced to support this alleged right by its advocates and 
then present a critique of those reasons. In this paper I will not consider the 
reasons advanced by those defending the "right to die" and "beneficent 
euthanasia" for extending this "right" to noncompetents by allowing others to 
exercise it for them by proxy and thus to engage in "beneficent non voluntary 
euthanasia."3 I will consider only the arguments for "voluntary euthanasia," or 
the exercise of the "right to die" by competent individuals. 
The Argument for the "Right to Die" or "Beneficent Euthanasia" 
The basic argument to support the "right to die" or "beneficent voluntary 
euthanasia" can be fairly summarized as follows: In voluntary euthanasia the 
person to be killed kindly wishes to be killed; hence, no one is doing that person 
an injustice by killing him. The person's desire to be killed is reasonable in view of 
the suffering and/ or humiliation he is experiencing; at times, others are suffering 
terribly too, psychologically or economically or both. Killing this person, who, 
after all, freely consents to being killed and who may even be begging to be killed, 
is thus a reasonable way to end all this suffering. While it is true that some persons 
in our society object to killing of this kind on the grounds that it is immoral and 
constitutes an attack on some presumed "sanctity of life," it would be both cruel 
and unjust to impose their values on someone who freely chooses to be killed and 
on those who seek compassionately to help this person realize this choice. Thus, 
the argument concludes, voluntary beneficent euthanasia, which respects the 
person's right to die, is both morally right and ought to be legally permissible.4 
The argument just advanced provides support for the legalization of a "right to 
die" or of voluntary euthanasia and claims that it is morally right for human 
persons. It has, therefore, anthropological and moral presuppositions. The 
anthropological presupposition concerns the meaning of "human person," while 
the moral presupposition concerns the proper way to make good moral choices. I 
will now seek to identify these presuppositions by examining the writings of some 
of the more prominent advocates of the "right to die" and beneficent euthanasia.5 
I will first take up the anthropological presupposition, which sharply 
distinguishes between bodily or biological life and personal or biographical life. 6 
The former is the condition for the latter and is of value only as the necessary 
substratum for the latter. Once the qualities associated with personal life are 
unrealizable, or until these qualities are attainable, bodily or biological life is of no 
real, personal value. On this view the person is the self-conscious subject, aware 
of itself as a self and capable of relating to other selves and of controlling 
subpersonal nature, including bodily and physical life. 
This understanding of the relationship between personal life and bodily life is 
reflected in the writings of leading advocates of the right to die. I will now show 
this by examining briefly the writings of three such proponents, Joseph Fletcher, 
Daniel C. Maguire, and Marvin Kohl, whose expression of this mentality is 
typical. 
Fletcher is by far the most explicit in presenting this understanding of the 
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human person. He insists on the "right of spiritual beings to use intelligent control 
over physical nature rather than to submit beastlike to its blind workings."7 He 
likens the morality of euthanasia to that of contraception, saying: "Death control, 
like birth control, is a matter of human dignity. Without it persons become 
puppets."8 For Fletcher, bodily life belongs to the impersonal world of nature, of 
"its." Human persons have the right to dispose of this physical, impersonal "it" in 
order to serve such personal goods as freedom, choice, and responsibility.9 
Maguire, the most ardent Catholic champion of "death by choice" or the 
"right to die,"lo holds, as does Fletcher, that the human person - the conscious, 
rational subject - has the right to subject physical nature to rational control, and 
he includes the bodily life of the human person or what he terms "biochemical 
and organic factors" in the world of physical nature. Echoing Fletcher, he 
proclaims that just as "birth control, for a very long time, was impeded by the 
physicalistic ethic that left moral man at the mercy of his biology" until 
"technological man discovered that he was morally free to intervene creatively 
and to achieve birth control by choice," so the same physicalistic ethic has 
condemned man "to await the good pleasure of biochemical and organic factors 
and allow these to determine the time and manner of his demise." Now, however, 
Maguire continues, technological man can creatively intervene, and has a moral 
right to intervene, in order "to terminate life either through positive action or 
calculated benign neglect rather than to await in awe the dispositions of organic 
tissue."" Bodily life for Maguire, as for Fletcher, is a "merely biological" good, 
not a personal good. 
The distinction between bodily and personal life is not so sharply made by 
Kohl as it is by Fletcher and Maguire. But it is nonetheless a controlling aspect of 
his defense of beneficent euthanasia. Throughout his writings he stresses the 
supremacy of such human and personal values as dignity and rational control in 
comparison to the value of bodily or physical existence. Kohl admits that many 
people oppose the movement to legalize euthanasia on the grounds that it is 
destructive, not protective, of human dignity insofar as it involves killing people. 
He is willing to concede that one may legitimately speak of the inherent dignity of 
human beings as connoting "excellences that set human beings apart from other 
species. "12 But he insists that this sort of dignity is not pertinent to the question of 
euthanasia. What is of supreme importance is another sort of dignity, an extrinsic 
dignity that consists "in having reasonable control over the major and significant 
aspects of one's life."13 This sort of dignity, he says, grounds our right to determine 
ourselves, and its exercise can at times require the choice to kill oneself or 
another. The central dignity of the person is "the actual ability of a human being 
to rationally determine and control his way of life and death and to have this 
acknowledged and respected by others."14 From this it follows that bodily life as 
such is subordinate and inferior to personal dignity. Thus actions destructive of 
bodily life are morally justifiable and legally permissible if they can enhance or 
protect the value of rational self-determination and control. 
Now to the moral or methodological presupposition behind the defense of the 
"right to die," i.e., the way the advocates of this right believe we ought to make 
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good moral judgments and choices, particularly in problematic or conflict 
situations such as that confronting us when we are trying to determine how we 
ought properly to care for a dying person or how we ourselves ought to choose 
when we are dying from some terrible malady. The advocates of the "right to 
die," it seems clear to me, hold that we ought to examine the alternatives and 
choose the one which promises the greater good or at least the lesser evil. They 
admit that death is, in some sense at least, an evil because it ends our life. But they 
hold that the choice of death and the choice to kill are morally upright when 
ordered to the protection of a good that is greater than physical life itself, a good 
such as personal dignity. Death is a disvalue, an evil of sorts, but we can choose 
death as a means to a good greater than bodily life itself. 
This methodology, which can be called proportionalistic, or the ethic of the 
proportionate good, is clearly articulated in the writings of Fletcher and Maguire. 
Fletcher stresses that the end justifies the means. In saying this he does not mean 
that any end can justify any means, but rather that we may rightly choose to do 
evil or effect a disvalue if there is a proportionate good that will be served by 
doing so, a good proportionately great enough to justify the willingness to effect 
the disvalue. Thus he writes: "The priority of the end is paired with the principle 
of 'proportionate good'; any disvalue in the means must be outweighed by the 
value gained in the end."15 In the case at hand, the beneficent killing of suffering 
persons who beg to be killed, the proportionate good serving as the end justifying 
the killing is the good of personal integrity or human dignity.16 
Maguire also champions the ethics of proportionate good. He claims that the 
most important thing to consider in determining whether it is morally right to 
choose to do an evil is "whether there is a proportionate reason to permit or 
intend [an evil such as death]."17 Indeed, the "basic category" for determining 
whether an action is morally right is the category of proportionate reason. IS 
Applying this principle to the choice to kill oneself or another for reasons of 
mercy, Maguire holds that such deeds are morally right so long as a good greater 
than physical life is served, a good such as personal integrity or the freedom of 
self-determination. 19 
Kohl, although he does not use the language of "proportionate good" or 
"proportionate reason," clearly uses the same ethical methodology. For him the 
key value in justifying beneficent euthanasia is the personal dignity which 
consists in "having reasonable control over the major and significant aspects of 
one's life," and protection of the dignity is the "overriding reason" justifying the 
choice to kill someone mercifully - what makes it to be a "beneficent" act.20 
The Argument Against the "Right to Die" and "Beneficent" Euthanasia 
Here I will first challenge the anthropological and moral methodological 
presuppositions behind the defense of a "right to die" and "beneficent" 
euthanasia, and then present a counterargument to the principal argument 
advanced to gain legal recognition of this right. 
The anthropological presupposition is that we must distinguish sharply 
between physical or bodily life and biographical or personal life. On this 
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presupposition there are two components of human beings. One component, the 
one really good and valuable, is the personal, which consists in the self-awareness 
of the individual and his or her capacity to control affairs through personal 
choice.21 This is obviously a dualistic presupposition that is philosophically 
untenable.22 Dualism of this kind makes it impossible for us to understand how a 
human being can be one being and not several. It renders utterly inexplicable our 
experienced unity of ourselves as bodily beings whose bodies are animated by a 
principle that also capacitates us to be the kind of bodily beings radically capable 
of discriminating between true and false propositions and of determining our 
selves by our own free choices. We personally are our bodies. When we break 
our arms we do not say that we have damaged our instruments but that we have 
hurt ourselves. 23 
The life of a living being is indistinguishable from the very reality of the being, 
a reality which pervades and includes everything that the being does. "Life," as 
two philosophers put it, "is not a characteristic of one part of a whole [the bodily 
aspect] and [personal] activities properties of some other part of it [the personal 
aspect)."24 Rather the same life permeates all the activities of the one human 
being, the one human person. Thus when my body dies, I die. Death is not the 
separation ofthe "person" from the "body." It is the death of the person.25 Bodily 
life is not merely a condition for personal life; it is an integral component of 
personal life. Bodily life, therefore, participates in the dignity of the person. 
The second, or moral-methodological, presupposition of the ethics of 
beneficent euthanasia is that the proper way to make good moraljudgments and 
choices, particularly in conflict situations, is to examine the alternatives and then 
choose that alternative which promises the greater proportion of good over evil, 
which promises the "proportionate" good. 
Each of us would obviously agree with the proposal that one ought to choose 
the alternative promising the greater "good" if by good is understood what is 
morally good, for the morally good choice is, after all, the one we are seeking to 
make in our efforts to shape our lives responsibly. But when the proportionalists 
advance choosing the greater good as the fundamental principle for making moral 
choices they are not using the term good in a moral sense. They are referring to 
good in the sense that it designates some perfection or set of perfections that 
contribute to the flourishing of human persons and communities, to good in the 
sense that life and health, justice, friendship, knowledge ofthe truth, and things of 
this kind are "good." Their assumption is that we can weigh or measure these 
goods in such a way that we can determine which among them is greater so that 
pursuing it justifies our choice deliberately to damage, destroy, or impede other 
"goods." 
But this assumption, namely, that the human goods at stake in making choices 
(goods like human life itself, knowledge of the truth, and their instantiations or 
realizations in specific persons) are commensurable is erroneous. Goods like 
these are utterly incomparable and incommensurable. For instance, to compare 
the good of life itself to the good of personal dignity or integrity, is like trying to 
compare the number 66 with the length of this line. One simply cannot compare 
them, for they are incomparably good aspects of the human person. This 
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assumption, in fact, requires that two incompatible conditions be met: "first, that 
a morally wrong choice be possible; second, that the alternative which is superior 
in terms of the proportion of good to bad be known. But this cannot be, for if the 
alternative which is superior in these terms is known, other possibilities fade 
away, and there can be no morally wrong choice."26 
The right way to make good moral judgments and choices is to choose, and 
otherwise will, those and only those alternatives of choice which are compatible 
with a love and respect for all the goods of human persons. This means that one 
ought not freely and deliberately choose to damage, destroy, or impede what is 
really a good, such as life itself, of human persons, a good constitutive of the 
well-being or full-being of human persons. Thus one ought not adopt by choice 
the proposal to kill innocent human beings.27 
From what has been said thus far, one can see that the anthropological and 
moral-methodological foundations of the ethic of beneficent euthanasia and the 
"right to die" are flimsy indeed. So too is the basic argument they offer to support 
their claim that beneficent euthanasia should be legally permitted so that 
competent individuals may exercise their "right to die," as I now hope to show. 
If beneficent euthanasia is to be legally permitted and adopted as public policy, 
it will be necessary first of all to change the laws concerning homicide. It will also 
be necessary, to make sure that those to be killed in this "kindly" way give 
informed consent to being killed, to establish some kind of legal procedures, 
including governmental regulation. 
But, as Yale Kamisar and, most notably, Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle 
have pointed out,2S the legalization of voluntary euthanasia will inevitably work 
to the serious detriment of many persons who do not want to be killed. Once it is 
legally permissible for a person to consent to being killed and for others to help 
accomplish this choice of death, many who do not want to be killed will be under 
heavy pressure to consent to this "kindly" option. Many who are mortally ill 
worry that they are a burden to others and feel guilty for the care they need. Once 
they realize that they can, by availing themselves ofthe most technically efficient 
solution to the problems they cause by persisting in living, relieve others of the 
burden of caring for them they will begin to feel even more guilty should they 
stubbornly and perhaps selfishly refuse to consent to being killed. No doubt there 
will be occasions when relatives, healthcare personnel, social workers, and others 
will urge the dying to consent to this "kindly" treatment. 
There are many other serious disadvantages that will result from the 
legalization of beneficent voluntary euthanasia, such as abandoning care of the 
suffering dying and stopping or slowing work now being done to learn more 
about relieving their suffering and meeting their needs. But the most compelling 
argument against legalizing voluntary euthanasia is that it will inevitably cause 
injustices to many who do not wish to be killed and violate the liberty of all those 
in our society who do not accept the worldview of those advocating the "right to 
die." I have already noted that making voluntary euthanasia a matter of public 
policy will require a change in the law of homicide and will require governmental 
regulation of the practice to verify that only persons who want to be killed will be. 
The choice to be killed, moreover, is a personal, private choice, one that does not 
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foster a compelling public good. Should the choice be made legally available it 
will either demand extensive governmental regulation, no governmental 
regulation, or at least some measure of governmental regulation. Since this is so, I 
believe that the following argument, summarizing the position developed by 
Grisez and Boyle, not only merits the serious consideration of every person but 
also devastates the argument proposed to legalize voluntary euthanasia and the 
right to die. The argument can be put this way: 
If voluntary euthanasia is legalized without regulation, those who do not wish 
to be killed are likely to become unwilling victims; this would deny to them the 
protection they presently enjoy under the law of homicide. And since the denial is 
to serve a private interest, it will be an injustice. If voluntary euthanasia is 
legalized with close regulation which will involve the government in killing, 
those who abhor such killing will be involved against their wishes, to the extent 
that the government representing them will be used for this purpose. Since the 
government's involvement will be required only as a means to promote a private 
interest, this state action will unjustly infringe the liberty of all who do not consent 
to mercy killing as a good to whose promotion state action might be legitimately 
directed. A solution involving a compromise between legalization of voluntary 
euthanasia without regulation and legalization with close regulation would mean 
some degree of lessened protection together with some degree of government 
involvement - a situation which will result in injustice partly due to the reduced 
protection of the lives of those who do not wish to be killed and partly due to the 
unwilling involvement of those who do not wish to kill. Since the stated 
conditions are all the possible conditions under which voluntary euthanasia 
could be legalized, legalization is impossible without injustice. Therefore, the 
legalization of the "right to die," of voluntary euthanasia, must be excluded.29 
I thus conclude that the "right to die," or beneficent voluntary euthanasia, 
lacks moral and jurisprudential foundation. The alleged "right" is spurious, and 
the reasoning to support it is specious.30 
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Legislation," Minnesota Law Review 42 (1958) 970-1041; Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with 
Liberty and Justice, pp. 149-183. 
29. Here I have paraphrased the argument given by Grisez and Boyle, Life and Death with 
Liberty and Justicefor All, p. 153. See pp. 154-158 of their book (which, unfortunately, has never 
received the attention it merits) for an extended defense of the argument. 
30. Here I wish to repudiate a suggestion I made some years ago in an article, "Euthanasia vs. 
Benemortasia," in Linacre Quarterly (November, 1974). In that article I rightly opposed the ethic 
of euthanasia. However, I suggested the possibility that the "killing" of a person in intractable pain 
(e.g., a person trapped in a burning car from which it is impossible to remove him) might 
conceivably be regarded as "indirectly intended" or praeter intentionem. analogizing the situation 
to "killing" in legitimate self-defense and appealing to the teaching of St. Thomas in Summa 
theologiae 2-2, 64, 7. For many years I have realized that this suggestion was unsound and an 
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illegitimate effort to apply to this case the principle of double effect (for it is this principle which is 
behind Aquinas's analysis of "killing" in legitimate self-defense, when the human act, as specified 
by the object of choice, can rightly be described as "self-defense" and not as "killing"). However, I 
have not before formally repudiated the position taken in my 1974 article and thus wish to do so 
here. 
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